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Chief of Staff MacInerney: “It’s immediate, it’s decisive, it’s low 
risk, and it’s a proportional response.” 
President Shepherd: “Someday somebody’s going to have to 
explain to me the virtue of a proportional response.” 
–Fictional American President Andrew Shepherd 
From The American President 
ABSTRACT 
This Article applies the international humanitarian law (IHL) 
principle of proportionality to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), commonly referred to as drones,1 by the United States 
military forces (U.S. Military) and the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its armed conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the “war on terror” in places such as Pakistan, 
Yemen, Somalia, and Mali.2 Iraq and Afghanistan began as more 
conventional armed conflicts that yielded to occupations with a 
continuing conflict against irregular insurgents. Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Mali fall into the so-called “targeted killings” genre, 
defined as the “premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by 
States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized 
armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is 
not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”3 
 
1 There are hundreds of kinds of unmanned aerial vehicles. This Article focuses on two 
that have the capability to deploy lethal force—Predator and Reapers drones—and have 
been used extensively in this capacity. This Article will use the terms UAVs and drones 
interchangeably to refer exclusively to Predator and Reaper drones. 
2 Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
3 Philip Alston, UN: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 28, 2010), http://www.cfr 
.org/counterterrorism/un-report-special-rapporteur-extrajudicial-summary-arbitrary-execu 
tions/p22297. 
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Both of these types of situations are emblematic of what we can 
expect future military engagements to resemble: asymmetrical 
conflicts involving the use of highly sophisticated UAVs deployed by 
professional armed forces, remotely piloted from outside the theatre 
of conflict, attacking irregular militants who operate in or near 
civilian populations. For the purposes of this Article, collectively this 
tactic will be termed “UAV warfare.” 
In armed conflicts, the IHL proportionality rule (IHL 
Proportionality) prohibits an attack when the anticipated military 
advantage of the attack is excessive compared to the expected civilian 
harm. UAV warfare to date has resulted in a significant number of 
civilian casualties, leading some to conclude that the tactic is 
inherently disproportionate. These conclusions are often problematic. 
First, they commonly confuse or conflate IHL proportionality with 
similar concepts found in international jus ad bellum and human 
rights law or a colloquial sense of the term. Second, they nearly 
always issue summary conclusions of its effect with little explanation 
about the actual operation of the rule. 
In this Article, I examine IHL proportionality in detail and as 
applied in the context of the unique aspects of UAV warfare. Existing 
cases and commentary regularly assume that proportionality is a one-
size-fits-all rule, whether the impugned attacker is a four-star general 
or a lowly platoon commander. This Article asserts that 
proportionality requires different applications in the cases of high-
ranking and low-ranking belligerents. The Article also emphasizes 
how courts and commentators frequently fall into the trap of 
retrospectively applying casualty statistics to assess the 
proportionality of an attack, rather than using those statistics to 
inform the reasonableness of the attacker’s a priori assessment. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 5, 2009, the CIA, in conjunction with the U.S. Military, 
attacked and killed the leader of Pakistan’s Taliban movement 
Baitullah Mehsud in the Pakistani village of Zanghara.4 The 
 
4 Pir Zubair Shah, Sabrina Tavernise & Mark Mazzetti, Taliban Leader in Pakistan Is 
Reportedly Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world 
/asia/08pstan.html?_r=1&ref=baitullah_mehsud (Mehsud and his network were suspected 
to have carried out dozens of suicide attacks and the 2007 assassination of former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto); Ishtiaq Mahsud & Kay Johnson, Baitullah Mehsud Killed in US 
Strike, Pakistani Taliban Admit, THE WORLD POST (Sept. 25, 2009, 5:12 AM EDT), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/25/baitullah-mehsud-killed-i_n_268 278.html. 
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methodology of the Mehsud strike is interesting because, unlike the 
use of UAVs in Pakistan generally, a surprising level of detail is 
publicly available. The strike began as a joint effort between the 
governments of Pakistan and the United States, who had met one 
month earlier and agreed to target Mehsud and his network.5 The 
agreement quickly proved fruitful as Pakistani intelligence operatives 
delivered accurate leads using informants inside the Mehsud’s 
network, communications intercepts, and satellite imagery shared by 
the American and Pakistani intelligence services.6 As the trail grew 
hotter, the CIA escalated the aerial reconnaissance of Mehsud. 
Reports indicate that the United States allocated nine drones to gather 
intelligence on him prior to the attack.7 On August 5 or 6, a Predator 
drone conducting surveillance identified Mehsud on the rooftop of his 
father-in-law’s home while he was being attended to by one of his 
wives, receiving either an intravenous drip8 or a leg massage.9 The 
CIA knew that Mehsud had diabetes that was being treated by his 
wife’s uncle in Zanghara.10 The CIA also knew that Mehsud’s 
diabetes produced pain in his legs and that he often had leg massages 
to relieve the pain.11 According to a senior security official, “he was 
clearly visible with his wife.”12 Pakistan’s Interior Minister, A. 
Rehman, who observed the video, later stated, “it was a perfect 
picture.”13 
The United States struck quickly, using a UAV to deploy two 
hellfire missiles that killed Mehsud and eleven other people in the 
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Mehsud killed while getting ‘leg massage’: report, AFP (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www 
.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4Eq_E-YhxSAgx8uKC1d9lezD2-A. 
8 Shah et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
9 Mehsud killed while getting ‘leg massage’: report, supra note 7, at 3. 
10 Shah et al., supra note 4. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat 
Drones, A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, 11 (Notre Dame L. Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010) (There is some dispute about exactly who was on the 
roof with Mehsud at the moment of the attack. O’Connell indicates that Mehsud’s wife’s 
uncle may have been on the roof treating Mehsud at the time of the attack along with 
Mehsud’s wife, although this assertion is not sourced.). 
11 Pakistan Government Challenges Taliban to Present Proof Its Warlord is Still Alive, 
TAIPEI TIMES (Aug 12, 2009), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/08 
/12/2003450976. 
12 Shah et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
13 Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone 
program?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting 
/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer. 
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home, including Mr. Mehsud’s wife, his wife’s parents, one identified 
commander, and seven bodyguards.14 
In an armed conflict—which does not exist between Pakistan and 
the United States in the conventional sense—Mehsud, the 
commander, and his bodyguards would be arguably legitimate 
military targets. The three other civilians would likely be considered 
incidental civilian casualties. This view results in a nine-to-three 
belligerent-to-civilian ratio. 
Notre Dame Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, a noted expert on the 
use of force, came to a different conclusion about the Mehsud attack. 
She wrote that, “Presumably only Mehsud was an intended target. 
The strike killed twelve-for-one intended target . . . .”15 
A third way to view the attack is to look at the totality of the 
Mehsud mission. Jane Mayer, in The New Yorker, wrote that the 
August 6 strike was the last of sixteen UAV attacks that had targeted 
Mehsud, the previous fifteen being unsuccessful.16 She reported that 
the earlier, failed attacks were believed to have killed between 207 
and 321 civilians, depending on the veracity assigned to reports of the 
attacks.17 
The Mehsud example illustrates the difficulty in understanding and 
applying IHL Proportionality to UAV warfare. Defining the scope of 
the attack is one quandary. Defining who the combatants are is a 
second. A third quandary is whether IHL Proportionality applies at 
all. IHL is a legal regime that applies only in cases of “armed 
conflicts.” IHL differentiates armed conflicts from lesser forms of 
hostilities, such as riots and disturbances, by looking at the 
organization of the opposing forces and the intensity of the fighting. 
UAV Warfare is problematic on both counts. It involves ideological 
combatants in decentralized, fluid groups such as Al-Qaeda. And the 
fighting typically consists of sporadic acts of terror, as opposed to 
military armed force. UAV Warfare does not easily fit into the IHL 
box. 
 
14 Shah et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
15 O’Connell, supra note 10, at 11 (Based on her 12-1 assessment, O’Connell 
concluded that, “In the conditions of the Pakistan border region, using drones to 
selectively target individuals is impossible.”). 
16 Mayer, supra note 13 (while the previous attacks were unsuccessful in killing 
Baitullah Mehsud, other militants were killed in the attacks on his deputy Hakimullah 
Mehsud). 
17 Id. 
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Proportionality is one of the fundamental principles of IHL, along 
with humanity, distinction, and necessity.18 It limits the amount of 
incidental civilian harm that can be incurred in the pursuit of 
legitimate military objectives. Despite its importance, proportionality 
has always been one of the most difficult in terms of practical 
application. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor was called upon to form a committee 
to investigate whether North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
forces had violated IHL Proportionality, along with other IHL crimes, 
in its campaign against Serbia in 1999. On the issue of IHL 
Proportionality, the committee specifically concluded that, “[i]t is 
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general 
terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances.”19 
Notwithstanding that reality, critics and pundits liberally invoke 
IHL Proportionality when critiquing military attacks and campaigns.20  
Australian counter-terrorism expert David Kilcullen wrote in The New 
York Times in March 2009, relying on statistics provided by Pakistani 
sources, that the United States was killing fifty unintended targets for 
each intended target.21 He translated this into what he termed a United 
States “hit rate” of two percent. Daniel Byman of the Brookings 
Institute reported that, “for every militant killed, 10 or so civilians 
also died.”22 This equates to a 10% success or “hit” rate to borrow 
 
18 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING, J.P. DOC. NO. 3–60, at 
A2-A3 (2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_60606013.pdf. 
19 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, [hereinafter Final Report 
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign], 39 I.L.M. 1257 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the 
Former Yugoslavia June 13, 2000). 
20 See Aaleem Gardezi, Drone Strikes: A Violation of Law, THE NATION, (Apr. 3, 2010) 
at 6, available at http://www.nation.com.pk/E-Paper/lahore/2010-04-13/page-6 (“Further, 
Article 51(5) talks about the principle of discrimination and regards an attack to be 
indiscriminate when bombarded by any means or methods which may lead to an incidental 
loss of civilian life.”). 
21 David Kilcullen & Andrew Mcdonald Exum, Death From Above, Outrage Down 
Below, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17 
exum.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=death%20from%20above,%20outrage%20from%20below 
&st=cse (note that Kilcullen also stated that “American officials vehemently dispute these 
figures, and it is likely that more militants and fewer civilians have been killed than is 
reported by the press in Pakistan). 
22 Daniel L. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman. (Byman 
notes that “[c]ritics correctly find many problems with this program, most of all the 
number of civilian casualties the strikes have incurred. Sourcing on civilian deaths is weak 
and the numbers are often exaggerated, but more than 600 civilians are likely to have died 
from the attacks.”). 
2014] Applying Jus In Bello Proportionality 179 
to Drone Warfare 
Kilcullen’s terminology. Professor O’Connell concluded that 
Kilcullen’s figures of fifty civilians killed for every single suspected 
combatant killed is a “textbook example of a violation of the 
proportionality principle.”23 
The data is a matter of contention. Some sources suggest the UAV 
strikes are more successful in limiting civilian casualties. The New 
American Foundation conducted its own study and reported that the 
United States was killing far fewer civilians, achieving a hit rate of 
66%,24 and close to 75% under Obama.25 A reporter at The Real 
News26 interviewed Pakistani students at Quaid-i-Azam University, a 
conservative school located on the outskirts of Islamabad that attracts 
students from all over the country, on the subject of the 
UAVattacks.27 A Pakistani university student, Adnan Afridi, who 
hails from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 
Pakistan where many of the UAV strikes occur, expressed his support 
of U.S. strikes. “Basically,” he states, “I’m in favor of the drone 
 
23 O’Connell, supra note 10, at 24. 
24 Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Revenge of the Drones, NEW AMERICA 
FOUNDATION (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_of 
_the_drones (Bergen and Tiedemann indicate that “Since 2006, our analysis indicates, 82 
U.S. UAV attacks in Pakistan have killed between 750 and 1,000 people. Among them 
were about 20 leaders of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and allied groups, all of whom have been 
killed since January 2008. (A list of their names, as well as links to stories about the UAV 
strikes that targeted them, can be found in Appendix 1.)” Under Obama, the authors 
conclude that “the strikes have taken out at most a half-dozen militant leaders while also 
killing as many as 530 others. Of those, around 250 to 400 are reported to have been 
lower-level militants, about three quarters, and about a quarter appear to have been 
civilians. The strikes appear to have killed a slightly lower percentage of civilians in the 
past nine months than during the earlier years of the American drone campaign in 
Pakistan.”). 
25 Talk of the Nation: The Legal and Moral Issues of Drone Use, NPR (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125355144 (“While this analysis 
sheds a more favorable light on the US campaign, it still means that the attacks result in 
civilians end up as 25% of the casualties or more.”); see also infra note 27. 
26 THE REAL NEWS (July 15, 2010), http://therealnews.com/t2/about-us (accessed on 
July 15, 2010). (The Real News is an Internet based news organization that purports to 
conduct independent journalism. Its website offers the following description of its work: 
“The Real News Network is a television news and documentary network focused on 
providing independent and uncompromising journalism. Our staff, in collaboration with 
courageous journalists around the globe, will investigate report and debate stories on the 
critical issues of our times. We are viewer supported and do not accept advertising, 
government or corporate funding.”). 
27 Sean Nevins, Drones Strikes Stir Controversy in Pakistan, THE REAL NEWS (July 14, 
2010), http://www.therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3 
1&Itemid=74&jumival=5383&updaterx=2010-07-14+03%3A 08%3A20. 
180 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16, 173 
attacks because it (sic) just only killed the extremists and terrorists.”28 
Another unidentified student from Balochistan offers “If you talk to 
the tribal people, they will not oppose the drone attacks, because they 
are not creating a collateral damage; they are just hitting their 
targets.”29 
The personal experience of New York Times reporter David Rohde 
supports these Pakistani accounts. He was captured by the Taliban 
while investigating a story in Afghanistan. He later recounted the 
story of his captivity in a five-part series in the Times.30 The Taliban 
relocated him to a secret location near Miram Shah, the capital and 
largest town in North Waziristan in Pakistan.31 Rohde told of 
powerful missiles fired by an American UAV that “obliterated their 
target a few hundred yards from our house in a remote village in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas.”32 From his vantage point: 
[He] heard men shouting as they collected their dead. If many 
people had been killed, particularly women and children, we were 
sure to die. . . After about 15 minutes, the guards returned to the car 
and led me back to the house. The missiles had struck two cars, 
killing a total of seven Arab militants and local Taliban fighters. I 
felt a small measure of relief that no civilians had been killed.33 
No matter what ultimately is proven to be the real figure for civilian 
casualty rates, it is beyond dispute that civilians are killed as the 
expected collateral effect of UAV Warfare. The question posed by 
IHL Proportionality is: what rate of civilian casualty does the 
principle of proportionality accept? This Article examines the body of 
treaties and international tribunal statutes, commentaries, and 
jurisprudences pertaining to IHL Proportionality for clues as to how it 
will apply to UAV warfare. 
The Article makes two rather large assumptions. The first is that an 
armed conflict can and does exist between the United States and a 
global non-state actor such as Al-Qaeda. The second is that IHL 
proportionality pertains to United States’ attacks against enemy 
combatants in safe havens or friendly states such as Pakistan and 
ungoverned states such as Somalia. Commentators differ in their 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 David Rohde, 7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html. 
31 Id. 
32 David Rohde, A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21hostage.html. 
33 Id. 
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views about what legal regime applies to the friendly state scenario, 
ranging from jus ad bellum (the international law on the use of force 
as spelled out in the United Nations Charter and customary law), 
human rights law, U.S. constitutional law, and of course IHL. This 
article sidesteps these important and difficult issues. In order to focus 
squarely on IHL Proportionality, this Article assumes that an armed 
conflict exists, IHL is applicable to UAV warfare in the traditional  
sense of armed conflict (two organized militaries pitted against each 
other), and in the case of an organized military using UAVs to target 
irregular militants in “friendly” or lawless states. 
I 
BACKGROUND: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN UAV 
WARFARE 
A “revolution in military affairs,” or RMA, is defined as a “major 
change in the nature of warfare brought about the innovative 
application of new technologies which, combined with changes in 
military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, 
fundamentally alters the conduct of military operations.”34 UAVs are 
almost certainly an RMA.35 UAVs have seen an exponential growth 
in the United States military and they are “bringing about the most 
profound transformation of warfare since the advent of the atom 
bomb.”36 When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in “Operation 
Iraqi Freedom,” the United States had few operational drones in its 
arsenal.37 Today, it has 7,000.38 
A “UAV” is a pilotless aircraft that can be controlled from 
thousands of miles away to conduct reconnaissance or to deploy lethal 
 
34 JEFFREY MCKITRICK ET AL., The Revolution in Military Affairs, in BATTLEFIELD OF 
THE FUTURE: 21ST CENTURY WARFARE ISSUES 65 (Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. 
Grinter eds., rev. ed. 1998). 
35 PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 57 (2009). 
36 Sherwood Ross, Pentagon Robot Culture Ominous Development, OEN-OP ED 
NEWS.COM (July 18, 2010), http://www.opednews.com/articles/Pentagon-Robot-Culture   
-Omi-by-Sherwood-Ross-100718-172.html. 
37 Alan Brown, The Drone Warriors, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-219306853.html; Johann Hari, The Age of the Killer 
Robot is no Longer a Sci-Fi Fantasy, INDEP. (U.K.) (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www 
.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-the-age-of-the-killer       
-robot-is-no-longer-a-scifi-fantasy-1875220.html. 
38 Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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force remotely. The approach has several benefits. First, it eliminates 
the inherent limitations of a human in the cockpit. UAVs have 
virtually no gravitational or “G” force limits, whereas humans can 
endure a maximum of eight or nine G forces.39 Pilots can only fly 
several hours before fatigue becomes a factor, whereas UAVs can fly 
for long periods of time, some more than twenty-four hours.40 
Humans in combat are subject to raw emotions such as fear, rage, and 
revenge that affect decision making, while UAVs have no emotions. 
And UAVs remove pilots from harm’s way, a very appealing attribute 
for a United States Congress that is decreasingly willing to tolerate 
American casualties.41 
While the last ten years have seen an exponential rise in the use of 
drones, the military has been experimenting with UAVs throughout 
the twentieth century in order to minimize casualties. During World 
War I, the United States developed a prototype for an aerial torpedo 
called the “Kettering Bug” that could be preprogrammed to hit targets 
as far as 75 miles away.42 By World War II, the Air Force had a secret 
Air Force program called “Operation Aphrodite” to develop remotely-
controllable bombers.43 During The Vietnam War, the United States 
flew thousands of missions with reconnaissance UAVs called the 
“Ryan Fire Fly” and “Lighting Bug.”44 In the first Gulf War, the 
United States purchased Israeli reconnaissance drones and deployed 
them successfully in 522 sorties.45 According to a 1991 Department of 
the Navy report, “At least one UAV was airborne at all times during 
Desert Storm.”46 
The first Gulf War established that UAVs could be reliable and 
effective as an intelligence tool. However, it wasn’t until ten years 
later that the United States began to deploy weaponized drones. In 
 
39 Peter Tyson, All About G Forces, NOVA (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh 
/nova/space/gravity-forces.html. 
40 Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles, Human 
Rights Watch 10 (June 30, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0609 
web_0.pdf. 
41 SINGER, supra note 35, at 57. 
42 John DeGaspari, Look Ma, No Pilot!, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (Nov. 1, 2003), 
http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/membersonly/nov03/features/lookma/lookma.htm
l. 
43 SINGER, supra note 35, at 48. 
44 WILLIAM WAGNER, LIGHTNING BUGS AND OTHER RECONNAISSANCE DRONES 
(1982). 
45 Singer, supra note 35, at 57. 
46 Frontline: The Gulf War, Weapons: Drones (RPVs) (PBS television broadcast 1995), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/weapons/drones.html. 
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2001, the Air Force deployed drones armed with missiles in support 
of the invasion of Afghanistan.47 In 2002, the CIA carried out the first 
lethal UAV attack in Yemen (a country with which we were not at 
war) with a missile fired from a UAV.48 By 2010, UAVs were 
ubiquitous in the Afghanistan/Iraq war and used frequently by the 
CIA against targets in Pakistan. In 2009, the United States Air Force 
conducted over 200 missile UAV strikes.49 By early January 2010, the 
Air Force was deploying twenty drones over Afghanistan each day, 
twice as many as in the previous year.50 The CIA authorized 50 UAV 
strikes in Pakistan in 2009, 109 in 2010, 73 in 2011, and 51 in 2012.51 
It is important to note that there are two U.S. UAV programs.52 
One is run by the U.S. Military and the CIA runs the other. The 
military program is public and there is much written about it. Much 
less is known about the CIA’s UAV operation,53 but recent reports 
have indicated that the Obama administration is curtailing the CIA 
program in favor of the Department of the Defense.54 
There are three defining features of UAVs that feature prominently 
in IHL Proportionality discussions. The first is the fact that UAVs are 
piloted remotely from military bases sometimes located thousands of 
miles away from the active theatre of conflict.55 From the earliest 
days, armed forces have sought ways to distance the attacker from the 
target, in order to remove the attacker from harm’s way. The UAV is 
the latest innovation along these lines, but represents a monumental 
advance that permits an armed force to remotely operate UAVs from 
anywhere in the world. 
 
47 O’Connell, supra at note 10, at 1. 
48 CIA ‘Killed al-Qaeda Suspects’ in Yemen, BBC (Nov. 5, 2002), http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/2402479.stm. 
49 Christopher Drew, Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html. 
50 Id. 
51 Dr. Zeeshan-ul-Hassan Usmani, PAKISTAN BODY COUNT, http://pakistanbodycount 
.org/analytics. 
52 Mayer, supra note 13, at 3. 
53 Id. 
54 Micah Zenko, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 2003), http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone           
-strikes-pentagon/p30434. 
55 Rob Blackhurst, The Air Force Men Who Fly Drones in Afghanistan by Remote 
Control, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews 
/defence/9552547/The-air-force-men-who-fly-drones-in-Afghanistan-by-remote-control 
.html; see also Mayer, supra note 14. 
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The second is that different military personnel in various locations 
simultaneously monitor video feeds and other data produced by the 
drones. A typical scenario might have UAV pilots and bombardiers in 
Las Vegas; with UAV ground crews in Iraq; intelligence analysts in 
Garmin, Germany; strategic command in Tampa, Florida; and CIA 
operatives in Virginia—all watching the same video and other 
surveillance data, and conferring about it in a secure internet chat 
room.56 
The third defining feature is the ability of a UAV to conduct 
surveillance for long periods of time. This ability to loiter or dwell 
over an area is called “persistent stare” and it is one of the great 
advantages of UAV warfare.57 One UAV pilot described how his unit 
could monitor a section of a city for a week, identify militants, then 
use UAVs to track them to their quarters, and develop a full 
intelligence profile.58 Because no soldier is at risk in the field and 
subject to fatigue and hunger, the pilot can take her time in 
accumulating intelligence. UAVs are giving military forces an ability 
to be patient that is unprecedented. Military patience even has its own 
designated military unit. The United States has an operation called 
ODIN which stands for “Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize.” It 
is a squad specializing in and perfecting “persistent stare” tactics. 
There are over 400 ODIN personnel that support ground forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.59 One of its primary functions is to provide twenty-
four hour, seven day-a-week surveillance and it has the ability to use 
the data to distinguish insurgents from civilians. 
II 
PROPORTIONALITY: PRINCIPLE AND LAW 
IHL is a body of treaty and custom-based rules that regulates the 
conduct of armed conflict. Along with humanity, distinction, and 
necessity, proportionality is a cornerstone of IHL. The principle is 
designed to protect civilians in armed conflicts and it underpins 
provisions in several treaties and statutes. 
 
56 See Mark Bowden, The Killing Machines, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-to-think 
-about-drones/309434. 
57 SINGER, supra note 35, at 22; Michael Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the 
Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 296–97 (2011). 
58 SINGER, supra note 35, at 22. 
59 See Military, Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (Task Force 
ODIN), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, (last visited Mar. 18, 2013), www.globalsecurity.org 
/military/agency/army/tf-odin.htm. 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines “proportional” as an 
adjective describing something as “corresponding in size or amount to 
something else.”60 Thus an object can be described as proportional 
only when the two items are compared and an appropriate balance is 
struck between them based on an identified value. 
The essence of IHL Proportionality is the relationship or ratio 
between two discreet values. IHL proportionality balances two 
different concepts—military advantage and civilian harm. It is 
prospective in nature; so an attacker is obligated to estimate and 
compare military advantage and civilian harm at the time the attack is 
contemplated. IHL proportionality is rooted in humanitarianism.61 An 
attack is proportionate when the expected civilian harm is not 
excessive in relation to the expected value of the attack. 
When defining IHL proportionality, it is most helpful to clearly 
define what it is not. IHL Proportionality is often confused with jus 
ad bellum proportionality. Jus ad bellum proportionality is a different 
animal. It balances two occasions of military force and requires a 
sovereign state that has been attacked to respond with force that is 
proportional to that already used against it.62 One belligerent has 
already used force and hence the retaliator has an existing, tangible 
quantity to use in its calculation. This limitation of retaliatory force is 
rooted in fairness in international affairs. 
References to proportionality in the media are not always clear 
which rule they are referencing or whether they are simply using the 
term colloquially. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, European 
Union and United Nations officials criticized Israel’s response as 
“utterly disproportionate . . . carnage.”63 This could be referencing 
either kind of proportionality. Three years later, United Nations 
 
60 Proportionality Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://www.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/english/proportional. 
61 Note that the principle of proportionality does not pertain to harm to belligerents and 
thus if one belligerent force obliterates another force proportionality is not implicated. For 
example, in the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 in Sudan, British soldiers armed with 
gunboats, rifles, and machine guns mowed down over 20,000 Sudanese tribesman armed 
mostly with swords and lances. The Sudanese suffered a 90% casualty rate, while the 
British lost only 48 men, amounting to 2% casualty rate. Britain’s superior weaponry, 
compared to the Sudanese swords and lances, resulted in one of the most lopsided victories 
in the military history but it did not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality 
in the author’s view. Other international humanitarian law provisions, however, may have 
been relevant which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27). 
63 Keith Pavlischek, Proportionality in Warfare, 27 THE NEW ATLANTIS 21 (2010). 
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Secretary General Kofi Annan, during a briefing of the Security 
Council in 2006, commented that Israel’s military response to 
Hezbollah firing rockets into Northern Israel had been 
disproportionate.64 In his letter to Israel Prime Minister Sharon, 
Annan used the language of both paradigms. Annan uses jus ad 
bellum rhetoric when referencing the massive quantity of force used 
by Israel, citing F-16 fighter-bombers, helicopter and naval gunships, 
missiles, and bombs.65 And he uses IHL Proportionality in decrying 
the harm to civilians and relief workers.66 
IHL Proportionality is codified in treaties, statutes, and is a part of 
binding customary international law. While the clearest articulations 
of IHL Proportionality are found in Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions67 (AP I), in the Statutes of the United Nations 
international tribunals, and the International Criminal Court (ICC),68 
the concept was evidenced as early as the American Civil War. In 
1863, Abraham Lincoln issued General Order 100 during the 
American Civil War, commonly known as the “Lieber Code” which 
is widely considered the first attempt to reduce humanitarian law to 
writing.69 Proportionality is obliquely set forth Article 15, which 
provides that “Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of 
life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction 
is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of war.”70 
The term “incidental” is the crux of proportionality in Article 15, 
establishing a measure between the importance of the military 
objective and the level of acceptable harm to civilians injured as 
collateral to the attack. “Incidental” has carried over into the modern 
definitions, including the 1998 Rome Statute. 
Proportionality was also included in an interwar treaty that did not 
gain a consensus, although it did demonstrate the thinking that there 
existed a customary rule that required the attacker to strike a balance 
between a military force and incidental civilian harm. The 1922 Rule 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/470?OpenDocument [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 31(1)(c), July 17, 1998, 
A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
69 William J Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional 
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 95 (1982). 
70 Id. (emphasis added). 
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of Air Warfare states, “[T]he bombardment of cities, towns and 
villages, dwellings, or buildings is legitimate provided there exists a 
reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently 
important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger 
thus caused to the civilian population.”71 However, prior to World 
War II proportionality was not included in any binding international 
treaty.72 
After the World War II, flush with the memory of massive civilian 
death, the XIX International Conference of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
commenced discussions on various rules to protect civilians in future 
armed conflicts, including a resumption of the rule of proportionality. 
The conference adopted a set of draft rules including Article 8(b) that 
provided “[The combatant] is required to refrain from the attack if, 
after due consideration, it is apparent that the loss and destruction 
would be disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.”73 
While proportionality was not explicitly included in the four main 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (which were largely reformulations of 
previous treaties), the idea continued to resonate. In 1977, the 
Additional Protocols (AP I and II) to the four Geneva Conventions 
were finalized after laborious negotiations,74 and the rule of 
proportionality was included in the AP I in Articles 51(5), 57(2), and 
83(b).75 
Article 51 sets forth various protections of civilians, including a 
prohibition against indiscriminate attacks. Paragraph 5(b) lists as an 
indiscriminate act, “[A]n attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
 
71 Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air 
Warfare, Art. 24(4), 14 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 2201 (Feb. 19, 1923). 
72 Fenrick, supra note 69, at 98. 
73 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in 
Time of War, Oct. 15, 1956, ICRC, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf 
/Treaty.xsp?documentId=FEA0B928100D3135C12563CD002D6C10&action=openDocu
ment. 
74 Fenrick, supra note 69, at 97. 
75 The term “proportionality” was intentionally omitted in order to placate a number of 
delegations who could not accept the theory of proportionality owing to the two concepts 
of military advantages and harm to civilians as being “incomparable.” See Howard S. 
Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 128 (Dobbs 
Ferry ed., Oceana Publications 1979) (Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and 
Geneva Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the 
Protection of Victims of War). 
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objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”76 
Proportionality is also included in Article 57 which sets forth 
“precautionary measures” mandated by AP I. Paragraph 2(a) provides 
that 
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: . . . 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.77 
Proportionality finds a third expression in AP I in Article 85. That 
provision defines those violations of the AP I to be considered “grave 
breaches” as opposed to ordinary violations. The grave breaches 
differ from other provisions of IHL in that they are considered war 
crimes implicating criminal liability as opposed to creating state 
obligations.78 Paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c) of Article 85 provide that 
In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the 
following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, 
when committed willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of 
this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health: 
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian 
population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii); 
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing 
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii). . .79 
Even though the United States has not ratified AP I, it does recognize 
many of the prescriptions as binding as international customary law, 
including proportionality.80 
 
76 Protocol I, supra note 67, at Art. 51(5)(b). 
77 Id. at Art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
78 In addition, a state party has various other obligations toward a grave breach, 
including searching for persons in their territory accused of having committed a grave 
breach and either bringing them to trial or extraditing them to a jurisdiction that will 
prosecute them. 
79 Protocol I, supra note 67, at Art. 85(3)(b)–(c). 
80 Jason D. Wright, ‘Excessive’ Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the Proportionality 
Standard, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 819 (2012). 
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Proportionality was not explicitly included in the statutes of the 
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).81 However, ICTY Chambers have found that 
proportionality is a rule of IHL and a rule of customary law.82 As 
such, it is prosecutable under Article 3 of the ICTY statute (violation 
of the laws and customs of war).83 AP I Articles 51 and 57 have 
figured prominently in Chambers assessment that proportionally is a 
violation of customary international law.84 Similar to the AP I 
provisions, ICTY chambers often hold disproportionate attacks are 
tantamount to an indiscriminate attack.85 
Proportionality was included in the statute of the ICC, known as 
the Rome Statute, in the 1990s. The 1998 Rome Statute includes 
Article 8, which criminalizes war crimes for states party to them.86 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) proscribes a violation of the principle of 
proportionality as a serious violation of the laws or customs 
applicable in an international armed conflict.87 It defines the war 
crime of a disproportionate attack as 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.88 
As the Rome Statute was specifically codifying individual criminal 
liability, as opposed to AP I which proscribes general laws of war, it 
accordingly addresses mens rea more specifically than the other 
incarnations. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) specifies that the mens rea of a 
disproportionate attack, namely an attack committed intentionally, 
includes the knowledge that such attack will cause harm in excess of 
the military advantage. Second, the Rome Statute inserts a new type 
of harm to civilians to be included in the assessment of harm, namely 
 
81 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
82 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 11, 58–61 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Galic Trial 
Judgement]. 
83 Id. at ¶¶ 58–62. 
84 Iain Bonomy, Principles of Distinction and Protection at the ICTY, 3 FICHL 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 39 (2013). 
85 Id. 
86 Rome Statute, supra note 68, at art. 8. 
87 Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
88 Id. 
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that of “widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural 
environment.” Third, the Rome Statute imposes a “clearly excessive” 
standard as opposed to merely “excessive.” Each of these will be 
discussed below. The United States has signed but not ratified the 
Rome Statute.89 
Even where a country is not a party to AP I or the Rome Statute, 
state practice has established the principle of proportionality as a 
norm of customary international law applicable in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts.90 As set forth in the 2005 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on customary 
international humanitarian law, the customary rule is identical to the 
AP I Article 51 and 57 versions: 
Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.91 
Both high-ranking and low-ranking commanders are equally bound 
to apply proportionality when considering an attack. The high-ranking 
strategic commander must consider the military advantage of the 
overall contemplated strategy, for example using UAVs as an overall 
tactic to weaken Al-Qaeda by eliminating key militants in Pakistan. A 
lower-ranking tactical commander must also consider military 
advantage in executing an attack that is part of the overall strategy, 
such as a UAV pilot who is charged with deploying a bomb once a 
target is identified. 
This fact is borne out by cases at the ICTY that have applied IHL 
Proportionality to both scenarios; the overall proportionality of a 
strategic bombing campaign and the granular proportionality of a 
particular tactical attack. 
 
89 Neil Lewis, U.S. Rejects All Support for New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES (May 
7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/world/us-rejects-all-support-for-new-court  
-on-atrocities.html (the Rome Statute was signed on December 31, 2000, by President 
Clinton. President Bush subsequently renounced the United States’ obligations as a 
signatory through a letter to the United Nations on May 6, 2002). 
90 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck & Carolin Alvermann, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: Rules, 46 (Cambridge University Press 2005); see also 
Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application 
of the Principle of Proportionality in the Israeli Supreme Court Judgment on the 
Lawfulness of Targeted Killings, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310 (2007) (“The Targeted 
Killings judgment confirms the customary status of the principle of proportionality and its 
applicability to all IDF military operations during armed conflicts”); Galic Trial 
Judgement, supra note 82, at ¶ 62. 
91 Henckaerts et al., supra note 90, at 46. 
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In Prosecutor v. Strugar, the Chamber considered the criminal 
liability of Yugoslav General Pavle Strugar in commanding Serbia 
forces (JNA) during the shelling of the town of Dubrovnik from 
October 1 to December 6.92 Within the town there were legitimate 
military targets: a brigade of the Croatian National Guard Corps and 
paramilitary forces.93 Between 7000 and 8000 residents lived in the 
Old Town, a part of Dubrovnik enclosed in medieval fortified walls 
and possessing “exceptional architectural heritage, including palaces, 
churches, and public buildings.”94 
One of the charges levied against Strugar was that the campaign 
was a direct or at least an indiscriminate attack against civilian 
targets. The Chamber found that Strugar had intentionally targeted 
civilians and hence it was unnecessary to address the alternative 
proportionality charge based on civilians being harmed incidentally.95 
In dicta, however, the Chamber weighed in on the proportionality of 
the December 6 shelling of the Old Town. It found that there were no 
“Croatian firing positions or heavy weapons in the Old Town or on its 
walls on 6 December 1991.”96 It went on to state that 
[T]he evidence of the alleged Croatian firing positions, even were it 
to be assumed to be true or that it was believed to be true, and if it 
were accepted in the version which is most favourable to the 
Defence, would not provide any possible explanation for, or 
justification of, the nature, extent and duration of the shelling of the 
Old Town that day, and the variety of positions shelled.97 
As a former ICTY Judge Iain Bonomy wrote, the Strugar Chamber 
had concluded that the campaign waged was “so disproportionate that 
 
92 Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, IT-01-42-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 48–145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For 
the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) (there were several cease fires in place during this 
time period that failed). 
93 Id. at ¶ 22. 
94 Id. at ¶ 21. 
95 Id. at ¶ 281 (“In the present case, the Chamber notes that the Accused is charged, 
alternatively, with attacks which, although directed against military objectives, should 
have been expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian property, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated. However, as shown elsewhere in this decision, the issue whether 
the attack charged against the Accused was directed at military objectives and only 
incidentally caused damage does not arise in the present case. Therefore, the Chamber 
does not find it necessary to determine whether attacks incidentally causing excessive 
damage qualify as attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects.”). 
96 Id. at ¶ 194. 
97 Id. 
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it would have amounted to an indiscriminate attack.”98 Thus, Strugar 
was accountable on the basis of the entire campaign on December 6 
that consisted of hundreds of shellings from many different positions 
was disproportionate. While the ICTY only asserted jurisdiction over 
General Strugar as the strategic commander, his subordinates would 
in theory, be accountable for specific attacks on tactical commanders. 
In another case, Stanislav Galic was a General accused of waging a 
series of shellings and snipings against a besieged population in the 
town of Sarajevo. The Prosecutor in Prosecutor v. Galic argued to 
Chambers that it should “[A]nalyze the ‘concrete and direct military 
advantage’ at the level of each sniping and shelling incident.”99 
In making its findings, the Galic Chamber followed this 
recommendation and assessed proportionality on an incident-by-
incident basis.100 The Trial Chamber discussed in detail the 
proportionality of Scheduled Shelling Incident I, an attack in which 
two mortars were fired at a soccer match. The teams competing were 
comprised of both civilians and combatants. In terms of military 
advantage, the Chamber acknowledged that a significant number of 
[enemy] soldiers participated.101 Beyond the presence of enemy 
soldiers, no other military advantages were considered nor proffered 
by the defense. In assessing expected civilian harm, the Chamber 
stated that the spectators of the match numbered 200, including 
numerous children. Weighing these two criteria, the Chamber found 
that the particular shelling would “clearly be expected to cause 
incidental loss of life and excessive injuries to civilians in relation to 
the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.”102 Thus, IHL 
Proportionality was judged in Galic at a tactical, granular level.103 
 
98 Bonomy, supra note 84, at 40. 
99 Galic Trial Judgement, supra note 82, at ¶ 191. 
100 Id. at ¶ 372. 
101 Id. at ¶ 387. 
102 Id. 
103 Both Strugar and Galic in the above examples are commanding Generals, and yet 
Strugar is judged on the strategic proportionality of the Dubrovnik shelling campaign, 
while Galic is judged on the tactical proportionality of each shelling incident. The 
difference is attributed to the way the prosecution approached the theory of prosecution in 
the two cases, but both are proper expressions of the law. International criminal law 
provides for direct liability of military commanders where they plan and order crimes. But 
it also provides for command responsibility, an indirect form of responsibility based on a 
failure to control subordinates who commit crimes. The core of the Strugar theory of 
liability was Strugar’s direct responsibility for waging the campaign. The Galic theory 
focused on the proportionality of the separate incidents, and Galic is liable not for 
participating in Shelling Incident I directly but for being legally responsible for the 
subordinates who perpetrated the attack. The Prosecutor could have also pursued a theory  
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The treaty (AP I), statutory (UN Tribunals and the Rome Statute), 
and customary law variations of proportionality have subtle 
differences, but they share three main components: anticipated 
military advantage, expected harm to civilians, and the excessiveness 
determination. Each is discussed in turn. 
III 
MILITARY ADVANTAGE 
“Anticipated military advantage” is articulated in the 
aforementioned treaty provisions as “a direct and concrete military 
advantage from the attack.”104 To comprehend military advantage, its 
four components—military, anticipated, direct, and concrete—must 
be understood. 
A. Military 
Legitimate military objectives must confer some military 
advantage. The military advantage cannot be derived via civilian 
targets. For example, an attack with purpose of bringing about the 
capitulation of an armed force through a campaign directed against 
the civilian population to undermine its support for the war would not 
constitute a military advantage. This is true even if it brings about the 
end to an armed conflict. 
The Commentaries to the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
(Commentaries) offer a narrow view of military advantage. The 
military advantage envisioned by the Additional Protocols is limited 
to attacks that gain territory or deplete the enemy force: 
[E]ven in a general attack the advantage anticipated must be a 
military advantage and it must be concrete and direct; there can be 
no question of creating conditions conducive to surrender by means 
of attacks which incidentally harm the civilian population. A 
military advantage can only consist in ground gained and in 
annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces.105 
This simplistic view from 1977 is difficult to apply to UAV 
warfare. Modern insurgent warfare will require a broader 
 
of violation of strategic proportionality against Galic, and she could have prosecuted the 
tactical commander of Scheduled Shelling Incident I for a violation of tactical 
proportionality. The practical differences between strategic and tactical proportionality are 
discussed below. 
104 Galic Trial Judgement, supra note 82, at 191. 
105 Protocol I, supra note 67, at 2218 (Commentary-Protection of Civilian Population). 
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interpretation of the term “military” than explained by the AP 1 
commentaries. “Gaining ground” is frequently not relevant because 
ideological insurgents are often transnational with no particular 
interest in territory. “Annihilating or weakening the enemy” is 
therefore the focus of the military advantage of UAV warfare if the 
commentary definition is presumed valid. With an ideological 
militant group, what constitutes “weakening the enemy force” can be 
subtle. UAV Warfare can serve to weaken a militant group by 
targeting leaders, thus disrupting the leadership continuity. But even 
targeting random fighters could arguably undermine the group’s 
security and confidence. One writer described the latter tactic as 
follows: 
Killing terrorist operatives is one way to dismantle these havens. 
Plans are disrupted when individuals die or are wounded, as new 
people must be recruited and less experienced leaders take over 
day-to-day operations. Perhaps most importantly, organizations 
fearing a strike must devote increased attention to their own security 
because any time they communicate with other cells or issue 
propaganda, they may be exposing themselves to a targeted 
attack.106 
On the other hand, some pundits argue that UAV attacks have the 
opposite effect. They serve to strengthen the enemy because the high 
risk of civilian harm radicalizes the population and helps to enlist 
additional recruits.107 
In short, UAV Warfare requires a more expansive view of 
“weakening the enemy forces” than the 1977 commentaries suggest. 
B. Anticipated 
The military advantage in the proportionality equation is based on 
its “anticipated” value. Often, claims of UAV attacks being 
disproportionate are based on published reports of casualties. These 
claims emanate from a post hoc statistical analysis of an attack or 
campaign. However, such claims are improper as proportionality is 
only prospective in nature. Proportionality requires balancing the 
anticipated military advantage of the attack against the expected harm 
to civilians. Each of the values in the ratio must be assessed based on 
the time the attack was calculated, not on the result of the attack. 108 
 
106 Id. 
107 Hassan Abbas, Are Drone Strikes Killing Terrorists or Creating Them?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2013); Byman, supra note 22. 
108 See Thomas Haine, A Legal Framework for Drone Attacks in Pakistan, THE 
WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/01  
2014] Applying Jus In Bello Proportionality 195 
to Drone Warfare 
Frequently, commentators who argue that UAV Warfare is 
disproportionate base their argument on the results of an attack rather 
than the validity of the decision beforehand. The prospective nature of 
IHL Proportionality is borne out by comments made by states 
negotiating the terms of AP I. Germany stated, for example, “the 
decision taken by the person responsible has to be judged on the basis 
of all information available to him at the relevant time, and not on the 
basis of hindsight.”109 
It is useful to illustrate this point with a UAV attack targeting 
Baitullah Mehsud. On June 23, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the 
June 23 attack), the United States had intelligence that Mehsud was 
attending a gathering of persons in Pakistan assembled “to mourn the 
deaths of people killed in drone attacks.”110 The United States fired 
two missiles at Mehsud, but failed to kill him. According to reports, 
45 militants and 41 civilians were killed.111 The appropriate analysis 
under AP I proportionality would revert to the time of the 
contemplation of the attack to evaluate the commander’s state of mind 
on the anticipated “direct and concrete” military advantage of 
targeting Mehsud. As the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, it could be 
argued that he inherently constitutes a significant military objective 
and his elimination would cripple the Taliban. When the attack is 
targeting a particular person (as opposed to a broader strategic 
objective such as the conquest of an important region) two 
considerations come into play. The first would be the likelihood of the 
particular attack in achieving the goal of elimination. The second 
would be the military advantage of eliminating that person. 
Regarding the likelihood of success for a particular attack, 
proportionality would require the commander, before making the 
decision to proceed with the June 23 attack, to consider the results of 
previous attempts. Because past results inform the reasonable 
expectation of future acts, the duration of any campaign is relevant. 
The more protracted a military campaign, the more data available and 
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imputed to a commander from past results. A lengthy military 
campaign using consistent tactics will have the effect of negating 
proportionality’s prospective nature as the abundance of data would 
set a baseline for what military advantage can be anticipated from an 
attack. There is a plethora of data (and opinions) on the results of 
UAV attacks since 2004.112 One study concluded that “85 per cent 
[sic] of those killed between 2004 and 2012 were ‘militants’” of some 
sort.113 However, as the targets all presented as civilians, all studies 
acknowledge that it is exceedingly difficult to quantify which 
casualties are in fact militants with certainty.114 The reasonableness of 
any assertions with regard to anticipated success of eliminating 
targeted suspects will be scrutinized at least publicly and very likely 
judicially reviewed in the context of the inferences drawn from the 
vast amount of data from past attacks. 
Regarding the evaluation of targets in order to assess their relative 
military value (targeting an enemy commander versus a foot soldier), 
UAV Warfare is much trickier than conventional armed conflict. 
Conventional warfare involves clear rank and hierarchy; UAV 
warfare attempts to identify the leadership of irregular fighters that 
are hiding as and amongst civilians. 
Even when a militant is identified by a UAV or through 
intelligence, it may not be clear whether the target is a so-called 
“high-value” target with a leadership role or a low-value rank-and-file 
fighter who poses little threat to the United States.115 Indeed, a 
Stanford University study found that there was evidence to suggest 
that the “vast majority” of those killed in UAV strikes in Pakistan 
have been low-level militants.116 The study goes on to say, 
Based on conversations with unnamed US officials, a Reuters 
journalist reported in 2010 that of the 500 “militants” the CIA 
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believed it had killed since 2008, only 14 were “top-tier militant 
targets,” and 25 were “mid-to-high-level organizers” of Al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, or other hostile groups. His analysis found that “the 
C.I.A. [had] killed around 12 times more low-level fighters than 
mid-to-high-level” during that same period. More recently, Peter 
Bergen and Megan Braun of the New America Foundation reported 
that fewer than 13% of drone strikes carried out under Obama have 
killed a “militant leader.” Bergen and Braun also reported that since 
2004, some 49 “militant leaders” have been killed in drone strikes, 
constituting “2% of all drone-related fatalities.”117 
A different study found that “only about 2 percent of NATO’s drone 
kills were strategically important enemy personnel.”118 
Low-level fighters are legitimate military targets. However, in a 
proportionality calculation, the value of the target is offset against the 
expected civilian harm. Therefore, the lower the value of the target, 
the less civilian harm is acceptable. 
One way of identifying high-value targets is the use of so-called 
“signature strikes,” where the targeting criterion is not based on 
appreciable evidence of a combatant’s rank, but rather their “pattern 
of behavior.”119 Some critics suggest that this methodology for target 
selection is too lax.120 
Another method of gearing the UAV program toward high-value 
targets is the so-called “kill lists.”121 U.S. drone operations that target 
combatants in friendly states like Pakistan rely increasingly on 
predetermined lists of high-value targets. The kill-lists are 
controversial not only because of the subjective nature of selecting 
names in the war on terror context,122 but also because high-ranking 
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military and political figures are personally involved in its creation.123 
Several reports indicate that President Obama personally signs off on 
all strikes outside of Pakistan.124 President Obama is Commander-in-
Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and can appropriately weigh in on 
critical military decisions. But by participating in the granular 
inclusion/exclusion discussion, he can inject a political component 
into the process calls that may question the validity of the assignment 
of military advantage. 
One criticism of the list as an a priori assessment of military 
advantage is the dilution of the military value due to the sheer 
numbers on the list. Mr. Obama’s own chief of staff, William M. 
Daley, criticized the kill list on this ground, stating, “One guy gets 
knocked off, and the guy’s driver, who’s No. 21, becomes 20? . . . At 
what point are you just filling the bucket with numbers?”125 
Critics have levied the charge that the White House participates in 
the kill-list process to restrain the overly aggressive nature of the CIA 
and military UAV programs: 
So certainly, according to what we’ve heard, both the CIA and . . . 
the element of the military that does these strikes are pretty 
aggressive. They want to find targets and kill them, and so I think 
the role of the White House—the role that President Obama 
assigned to the White House—was, and to himself, was really one 
of restraining the agencies, double-checking the agencies, making 
sure that at this sort of broader strategic, political level, that there 
was good judgment being exercised, that you weren’t taking a shot 
in a very marginal situation or for a marginal gain and risking a big 
backlash that would put the United States in a worse position.126 
The fact that intervention is required by the executive branch raises 
questions about the objectivity of the U.S. UAV programs and the 
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reliability of the assigned value placed on a target that is used to 
justify civilian harm. 
In the end, the proportionality of an attack is judged by examining 
the bona fide assessment of military advantage made by the attacker. 
All persons who participate in the attack decision are responsible 
when the collective decision leads to a disproportionate attack. And 
an attack with little military advantage cannot be bolstered by the 
personal approval of a Head of State, particularly when his 
involvement lends a political character to the process. 
C. Concrete 
The term “concrete” is qualitative; it requires that the military 
advantage must be substantial.127 As such, “advantages which are 
hardly perceptible . . . should be disregarded.”128 The careful selection 
of language in Articles 51, 52, and 57 confirms the fact that the 
military advantage must be substantial. Article 52, which pertains 
only to the protection of civilian objects, employs the term “definite” 
(but not concrete) military advantage. The commentary to Article 52 
explains that the Article 51 “concrete and direct military advantage” 
standard imposes stricter conditions on the attacker than the mere 
“definite advantage” of Article 52.129 Thus, the inclusion of the word 
“concrete” in 51 was deliberate and designed to impose a higher 
standard. 
It is important to note that while the advantage must be substantial, 
substantial is not absolute but contextual. A commander must assess 
the concreteness of the military advantage in relation to the 
circumstances prevailing at the time. Such factors include the stocks 
of different weapons available, likely future demands on those 
weapons, the timeliness of attack, and risks to the commander’s own 
forces.130 
In analyzing the concreteness of the military advantage, it is 
important to differentiate tactical and strategic attacks. Some critics 
suggest that while a UAV attack in Pakistan or Yemen may yield a 
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tactical gain in the short term, it has an “adverse strategic effect.”131 
The attacks can “fuel movements and reorde[r] the alliances and 
positions of local combatants.”132 Because ideological groups have no 
territorial anchor, success in one region may simply cause a group to 
move to another area. While there are reports that UAV warfare has 
had some success in Pakistan significantly weakening Al-Qaeda,133 
hundreds of members have “fled to battlefields in Yemen, Somalia, 
Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere.”134 The displaced fighters bring skills and 
weapons to the new regions, turning conflicts there into “fiercer, and 
perhaps longer-lasting, conflicts.”135 
D. Direct 
The term “direct” precludes reliance on attacks whose anticipated 
military advantage is derivative. An attack whose advantage would 
only “appear in the long term” would be too indirect.136 Arguably, this 
does not preclude an attack whose principle value is in the long term 
if there is some quotient of short-term benefit. 
One must keep in mind the tactical/strategic difference in 
examining directness. In the case of the granular tactical attack, 
directness would take into account the advantage of that individual 
attack. In the case of a military campaign (eliminating insurgents in a 
territory over a period of time), the advantage is perceived value of a 
broader objective. 
Some commentators and writers have advanced the notion that 
proportionality permits a tactical attacker the right to consider the 
strategic importance of the greater military campaign (hereinafter 
referred to as the “full context of strategy view”). During AP I 
negotiations between several states gave explicit support to this view, 
stating that the “military advantage anticipated from an attack are 
[sic] intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack as a 
whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.”137 
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There is support for this position in some official United States 
military publications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a document 
called “Joint Targeting,” whose purpose was to provide “fundamental 
principles and doctrinal guidance for the conduct of joint targeting 
across the range of military operations.”138 This publication addresses 
“operational-level considerations for the commanders of combatant 
commands, joint task forces, and the subordinate components of these 
commands to plan, coordinate, and execute targeting successfully.”139 
It discusses proportionality and provides 
The military advantage anticipated is intended to refer to the 
advantage anticipated from those actions considered as a whole, and 
not only from isolated or particular parts thereof. Generally, 
“military advantage” is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked 
to the full context of a strategy.140 
The text of Articles 51, 57, and 85 does not specify whether the 
tactical attacker is entitled to consider the “full context of strategy.” 
Some commentators have asserted that it can be deduced from that 
because what is meant by “attack” in AP I is a series of multiple acts, 
military advantage would necessarily be based on more than one 
act.141 Similarly, Article 57(2)(a)(i) states that those who plan or 
decide upon an attack shall “do everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives—in the plural—to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects. . .”142 On the other hand, Article 57 (b) specifically 
refers to “attack” and “objective” in the singular: “[A]n attack shall be 
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not 
a military one. . .” 
I believe that generally the full context of strategy view is an 
incorrect interpretation of the law. In international tribunal 
jurisprudence, courts have not used the full context of strategy in 
assessing military advantage of a granular tactical use of force. As 
previously discussed, the Galic Chamber weighed the “concrete and 
direct military advantage” of each sniping and shelling incident.143 
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Rather, it is clear from the ICTY jurisprudence that proportionality 
is based on the bona fide considerations of the person contemplating 
the attack. It is impermissible for an attacker to justify an attack based 
on information not known or actually considered by the attacker. A 
general commanding a belligerent force, who is planning a military 
campaign to attack an enemy, is privy to and entitled to consider the 
full context of strategy. However, a platoon commander executing a 
single component of the broader attack, such as ordering artillery fire 
on a location, would not be privy to the same intelligence as the 
general nor would it be reasonable for a low-ranking fighter to factor 
in the “full context” intelligence if he had possessed it. Thus, whether 
the “full context of strategy” is a legitimate consideration is not a 
matter of policy, but rather whether the attacker legitimately 
possessed strategic intelligence and had the authority to make 
reasonable use of it. 
This position is elegantly supported by the Strugar Chamber, 
which found that the anticipated military advantage must be assessed 
from the perspective of the “person contemplating the attack, 
including the information available to the latter, that the object is 
being used to make an effective contribution to military action.”144 
Furthermore, the perspective of the attacker must be reasonable. The 
Galic Chamber held “[I]t is necessary to examine whether a 
reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual 
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to 
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result 
from the attack.”145 
In this example, because General Galic was presumed to be in 
possession of the “full context of strategy”146 by virtue of his rank and 
authority, it potentially could have been a bona fide consideration in 
this tactical decision.147 
However, there are unique aspects to UAV warfare wherein the full 
context of strategy can rightfully by utilized by the tactical 
commander. UAV warfare facilitates information sharing between 
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strategic and tactical levels of command, sometimes described as the 
general-in-the-foxhole phenomenon. The simultaneous video setup 
affords a general the real opportunity to view an AUV attack in real 
time and participate in the tactical attack decision. AUV expert Peter 
Singer described the instance of a four-star General, recounting 
[. . .] how he had spent “two hours watching footage” beamed to his 
office. Sitting behind a live feed of video from a Predator drone, he 
saw the two insurgent leaders sneak into a compound of houses. 
Then he waited as other insurgents entered and exited the 
compound, openly carrying weapons. He was now personally 
certain. Not only was the compound a legitimate target, but any 
civilians in the house had to know that it was being used for war, 
what with all the armed men moving about. So, having personally 
checked out the situation, he gave the order to strike. But his role in 
the operation didn’t end there; the general tells how he even decided 
what size bomb his pilots should drop on the compound.148 
A joint strategic—tactical decision could provide the occasion for a 
tactical fighter to legitimately employ the “full context of strategy.” 
IV 
EXPECTED INCIDENTAL LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE, INJURY, OR 
DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN OBJECTS 
A. Expected 
Like the assessment of anticipated military advantage, the calculus 
of civilian is prospective. It is based on what harm was expected at 
the time of the attack not the civilian harm that actually occurs. 
Referring again to the June 23 attack on Mehsud, the United States 
fired two missiles at Mehsud. Reports indicated that 45 militants and 
41 civilians were killed.149 The appropriate analysis under AP I 
proportionality would revert to the time of the contemplation of the 
attack to evaluate the commander’s state of mind regarding the 
expected harm to civilians and civilian structures. If the attack 
decision-maker expected that four civilians would be killed in the 
attack but forty-one civilians were actually killed, four would be the 
appropriate number for the civilian harm side of proportionality 
analysis. Moreover, if the expected harm was that forty-one civilians 
would be killed and only four were actually killed, forty-one should 
be used for the analysis. 
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One ambiguity is just how certain the attacker must be of the 
resulting collateral damage and incidental injury before it is 
“expected.”150 As previously mentioned, evidence of the results of the 
attack, and of similar previous attacks, will be circumstantial evidence 
of the attacker’s reasonable expectation of harm. Because there is a 
plethora of data on rate of civilian deaths in UAV strikes, and any 
unreasonable claim of an expectation of harm would be scrutinized in 
that light. The more protracted a campaign, the more experiential 
knowledge a military commander would be expected to acquire about 
past civilian harm. 
Typically, battlefield decisions made in the fog of war are viewed 
generously because of the exigent circumstances involved.151 AUV 
pilots, on the other hand, function in a new environment. They control 
weapons that function in conflict areas while working in a civilian 
setting. They often work a shift as a UAV pilot and then go to their 
home living a normal civilian life. Retired Air Force Colonel Chris 
Chambliss once commanded UAV operations at Creech Air Force 
Base, when it was the command center for seven Air Force bases in 
the continental United States flying drones overseas.152 He states 
about UAV pilots that “On the drive out [to the Air Force base], you 
get yourself ready to enter the compartment of your life that is flying 
combat . . . and on the drive home, you get ready for that part of your 
life that’s going to be the soccer game.”153 
Another difference from the hectic battlefield is that drones have 
the ability to “loiter” over a target and take their time identifying 
militants within a civilian population. UAV pilots can monitor areas 
for days and even weeks (and indefinitely if multiple UAVs are 
deployed to the task), take their time in identifying militants, and then 
wait to deploy force until they are away from civilians and civilian 
structures.154 Given that “persistent stare” methodology is the polar 
opposite of the hectic battlefield and fog of war, UAV commanders’ 
decisions on expected harm will be scrutinized more closely. 
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B. Incidental 
Under AP I 51 and 57, it is the expected incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury or damage to structure (civilian harm) that is to be 
measured against the expected military advantage of the attack. The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines incidental as “being likely to 
ensue as a chance or minor consequence,” or “occurring merely by 
chance or without intention or calculation.”155 The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines it as “occurring or liable to occur in fortuitous or 
subordinate conjunction with something else of which it forms no 
essential part” or something “liable to happen.”156 Synthesizing those 
definitions, there are two aspects to incidental as it applies to civilian 
harm. The first is the harm is unintentional. The second is the harm is 
subordinate or nonessential to the primary purpose of the attack (i.e., 
likely to ensue as a minor consequence). 
One important reason why “incidental” has been integral to the 
definition of proportionality, from its earliest incarnations and carries 
over to the definition of AP I, is that it highlights the fact that 
civilians cannot be intentionally targeted under the Geneva 
Conventions under any circumstance. And incidental is important so 
that AP I 51 and 57 could not be used to justify an intentional attack 
on civilians even if the military advantage was great enough. It does 
not mean, however, that the harm has to be unanticipated. This is 
clear from the AP I commentaries that an attack on a military 
objective obligates a commander to calculate what the expected harm 
to civilians would be. The commentaries provide that: 
2212 Proportionality is concerned with incidental effects which 
attacks may have on persons and objects, as appears from the 
reference to “incidental loss.” The danger incurred by the civilian 
population and civilian objects depends on various factors: their 
location (possibly within or in the vicinity of a military objective), 
the terrain (landslides, floods etc.), accuracy of the weapons used 
(greater or lesser dispersion, depending on the trajectory, the range, 
the ammunition used etc.), weather conditions (visibility, wind etc.), 
the specific nature of the military objectives concerned (ammunition 
depots, fuel reservoirs, main roads of military importance at or in 
the vicinity of inhabited areas etc.), technical skill of the combatants 
(random dropping of bombs when unable to hit the intended target). 
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2213 All these factors together must be taken into consideration 
whenever an attack could hit incidentally civilian persons and 
objects. Some cases will be clear-cut and the decision easy to take. 
For example, the presence of a soldier on leave obviously cannot 
justify the destruction of a village.157 
The two paragraphs recognize that the expected harm depends on 
the contextual circumstances and that all potential risk factors should 
be included in the assessment. The commentary clearly states that 
“[i]n every attack they must carefully weigh up the humanitarian and 
military interests at stake.”158 Thus, an attacking unit that failed to 
assess all of the risk factors presumably incurs liability by failing to 
exercise due diligence. 
Not all civilians within a military objective would constitute 
“incidental harm.” As W. Hays Parks explains, 
It is clear that the Pentagon would be a military objective in war. It 
should be equally obvious that a civilian working there assumes a 
certain risk. His or her presence would not change the nature of the 
Pentagon as a legitimate target. Civilians killed within an obvious 
military objective are not “collateral civilian casualties.” Counting 
civilians employed within a military objective as “collateral civilian 
casualties” would only encourage increased civilian presence in a 
military objective in order to make its attack prohibitive in terms of 
collateral civilian casualties.159 
Incidental harm refers to harm to civilians located outside the 
boundaries of “obvious” military objectives. This means that in the 
insurgency context, with belligerents hiding amidst civilians and 
frequenting public mosques and markets, civilians who happen to be 
in the same mosque do not take on the same character as civilian 
employees at the Pentagon. The loss of protection occurs when the 
military character of the location is obvious and the civilians in the 
location have intentionally assumed that risk. 
C. Loss of Civilian Life, Injury, or Damage to Structure 
Distinguishing between militants and civilians is perhaps the 
greatest challenge of the insurgent/UAV Warfare context. Insurgents 
“do their best to mix in with the civilian population.”160 The difficulty 
of fighting in modern warfare against irregular militants is not their 
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killing but their identification.161 The International Committee of the 
Red Cross states that 
Over recent decades, the nature of warfare has changed 
significantly, and several factors have contributed to blur the 
distinction between civilians and combatants. Military operations 
have moved away from distinct battlefields and are increasingly 
conducted inside population centres, such as Gaza City, Grozny or 
Mogadishu. Civilians have become more involved in activities 
closely relating to actual combat. Combatants do not always clearly 
distinguish themselves from civilians, preferring for example to 
operate as “farmers by day and fighters by night. “Moreover, in 
some conflicts, traditional military functions have been outsourced 
to private contractors or other civilians working for State armed 
forces or for organized armed groups.162 
The dividing line between when a civilian is protected under the 
Geneva Conventions and whose potential harm be accounted for as 
incidental collateral damage, and a person who is a legitimate military 
target is the person’s direct participation in hostilities as evidenced by 
their “continuous combat function,” or the carrying out of acts “which 
aim to support one party to the conflict by directly causing harm to 
another party.”163 
The ICRC provides examples of directly causing harm, including: 
capturing, wounding or killing military personnel; damaging 
military objects; or restricting or disturbing military deployment, 
logistics and communication, for example through sabotage, 
erecting road blocks or interrupting the power supply of radar 
stations . . . . [i]Interfering electronically with military computer 
networks (computer network attacks) . . . transmitting tactical 
targeting intelligence for a specific attack are also examples . . . 
[t]he use of time-delayed weapons such as mines or booby-traps, 
remote-controlled weapon systems such as unmanned aircraft          
. . . .164 
The ICRC also provides examples of acts not directly causing 
harm, including “the production and shipment of weapons, the 
construction of roads and other infrastructure, and financial, 
administrative and political support.”165 
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The full exploration of the meaning of “continuous combat 
function” is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say it is a 
significant challenge in the application of IHL Proportionality to 
UAV warfare. 
The idea has also been put forward that even if they are very high, 
civilian losses and damages may be justified if the military advantage 
at stake is of great importance. The Prosecutor’s Committee in the 
NATO Bombing Report suggests that proportionality may condone an 
attack with significant anticipated harm to civilians where the military 
advantage expected from the attack would be decisive.166 
This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol. The 
Protocol does not provide any justification for attacks that cause 
extensive civilian losses and damages. Incidental losses and damages 
should never be extensive.167 However, it must be noted that strategic 
proportionality weighs the military advantage of a campaign against 
the expected losses of that campaign. Thus, “extensive” is itself 
relative. What may constitute extensive civilian losses for a single 
attack may be de minimus for the entire campaign. 
V 
EXCESSIVE 
A. General Principles 
The most difficult aspect of the proportionality analysis is 
establishing what amount of civilian harm is “excessive” relative to 
the military advantage. Observations on this task range from difficult 
(“the proportionality analysis is dauntingly complex”168) to 
impossible (“the determination of what constitutes “excessive” 
collateral damage is unclear to the point of inapplicability”169). 
One difficulty is that both values are subjective and difficult to 
quantify. The second difficulty is that military advantage and civilian 
harm are wholly dissimilar and difficult to compare. And while 
fundamentally dissimilar they can also be interrelated so that the 
relative weight assigned to one value may change the value of the 
other.170 This correlation is particularly evident in asymmetrical UAV 
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warfare in urban areas. The very nature of the difficulty in identifying 
belligerents in a densely populated urban area and the evanescent 
nature of the “kill” window once a target is located may work to 
enhance the military advantage of the attack. 
The sequence of UAV attacks targeting Mehsud is emblematic of 
this phenomenon. Mehsud was successful at hiding amongst civilians 
and had managed to avoid harm in fourteen UAV attacks. His 
elusiveness amongst civilians arguably elevated military advantage 
when he was ultimately identified. 
Proportionality is frequently incorrectly portrayed as a prescription 
against excessive force.171 However, the extent of force is only 
relevant in relation to the military advantage reasonably expected;172 
the standard is “excessive” not “extensive.”173 
Despite these inherent difficulties, jurisprudence of the ITCY 
yields several important clues about how the excessive standard will 
be interpreted by judges. 
B. Courts Will Tend to Expand Protections of Civilians 
First, courts will, when faced with IHL Proportionality, construe 
“as narrowly as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents 
and, by the same token, so as to expand, the protection according to 
civilians.174 So while a few commentators and militaries have lobbied 
for a more expansive interpretation (“full context of strategy”), 
judicial review to date does not support that view. 
C. Military Advantage Will Be Taken at Face Value 
Second, military advantage will be taken at face value. This will be 
true whether the judges are assessing tactical or strategic 
proportionality. In Struger, the issue was the proportionality of the 
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Dubrovnik shelling campaign.175 The judges assessed military 
advantage based simply on the number of arguable military targets in 
the vicinity of the town. The timing and relative value of particular 
targets as a matter of overall strategy was not raised nor 
contemplated. In Galic, Chambers considered proportionality of 
shellings and snipings of Sarajevo.176 Beyond the presence of enemy 
soldiers, no other military advantages were considered nor proffered 
by the defense. Without going beyond the basic statistics of the 
number of combatants and civilians, the Chamber rendered its 
decision.”177 This may be attributable to the reluctance of civilian 
judges to dig too deep into military thinking, or it could be the failure 
of defense counsel to proffer those arguments. However, delving into 
more complex constructions of military advantage may be practically 
precluded by the high degree of subjectivity and the fact that in many 
situations the best source of that kind of evidence would be the 
testimony of the defendant. 
D. The Type of Weapon Used Will Be Relevant 
Third, the type of weapon utilized is relevant to the excessiveness 
calculation. In Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, the Trial Chamber 
considered the proportionality of attacks against the town of Stari 
Vitez in central Bosnia. The Trial Chamber inferred from the “arms 
used that the perpetrators of the attack had wanted to affect Muslim 
civilians.”178 While the Chamber found that the attacks were directed 
at civilians as opposed to being a defensive response to military 
aggression, it concluded that even if there had been such aggression 
the use of heavy sophisticated weapons and the methods used “could 
not be deemed proportionate to it.” The Chamber added that Blaskic 
knew that the use of heavy weapons to seize villages mainly occupied 
by civilians would have “consequences out of all proportion to 
military necessity.”179 
E. Battlefield Decisions Will Be Viewed More Leniently 
Fourth, judges will view an ad hoc attack decision in the heat of 
battle with more leniency than a premeditated attack or a protracted 
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series of attacks. Attacks subject to a proportionality review can be 
broken down into two categories. The first type consists of attacks 
that are premeditated in nature, decided only after careful 
consideration of the circumstances. The second type consists of 
attacks that, given the circumstances, are conducted under exigent 
circumstances and thus without the same contemplative ability. The 
second type would include attacks required to eliminate an immediate 
and serious threat, for example when UAV operators identifies a 
suspected suicide bomber in or heading toward a civilian area. 
Another example might be a “return fire” scenario, where enemy 
artillery fire must be responded to immediately to neutralize the 
weapon or in order to prevent flight of the combatants. 
For obvious reasons, tribunals judging the proportionality of an 
attack would grant far more discretion to commanders in the latter 
“urgent” category as opposed to the premeditated variety. In the Galic 
case, for example, the Trial Chamber found the shelling of the soccer 
match to be disproportionate180 when there were no exigent 
circumstances in evidence that required targeting those soldiers at that 
moment and there was no reason the attackers could not have waited 
until the risks to civilians were minimized. There was no exigency 
involved in targeting a few low-ranking soldiers playing in a soccer 
match: They offered little in the way of military advantage and the 
attacker had the option of waiting until the match ended. Thus the 
Chamber summarily concluded the attack was disproportionate. 
Other commentators share this view. The Israel Air Force 
conducted an attack on Hamas militants intermingled in a civilian 
population within the Gaza Strip on December 27, 2008, at the onset 
of Operation Cast Lead, “probably in accordance with a menu of 
objectives prepared some time in advance . . . .”181 Commenting on 
the proportionality of the attack, the author suggests that this kind of 
attack would be held to a higher standard by virtue of the fact it was 
premeditated. He states that “[O]nce an operation is already under 
way, commanders should be held to a different standard for ad hoc 
military decisions when time and resources are lacking to gather and 
analyze information regarding the potential results of their actions.”182 
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With UAV Warfare, the loitering capability of the UAV operation 
is the new form of premeditation. Unless there are exigent 
circumstances, the UAV unit can follow the target until the target is in 
an area where civilian harmed is minimized. Lt. Colonel Chris 
Gough, a UAV pilot who previously piloted manned F-16 fighter jets, 
explained that the drone unit did not mistakenly hit civilian targets 
because they have “the resources to make sure we’re right.”183 
F. Mens Rea Has Objective and Subjective Components 
Fifth, in the criminal context, the mens rea of a disproportionate 
attack has both objective and subjective components. Regardless of 
what conclusions the attacker actually made with regard to the 
excessiveness of civilian harm, the circumstances will be judged 
objectively. This was the position advanced by the committee 
assembled by the Prosecutor of the ICTY to investigate whether the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had violated principles 
of proportionality in bombing Serbia.184 On the issue of the 
appropriate standard of review, the committee suggested “the decisive 
yardstick should be the judgment of the ‘reasonable military 
commander.’”185 This is similar to the view of Chambers at the ICTY. 
In Galic, the Chamber employed the standard of a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, 
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her.186 
This comports with the views of many militaries, whose own 
manuals advance an objective standard. The manual used by 
Canadian armed forces, for example, indicates “consideration must be 
paid to the honest judgment of responsible commanders, based on the 
information reasonably available to them at the relevant time, taking 
fully into account the urgent and difficult circumstances under which 
such judgments are usually made.” It also indicates that the 
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proportionality test must be examined on the basis of “what a 
reasonable person would do” in such circumstances.187 
The difference of opinion appears to be whether the objective 
standard is based on a reasonable military commander or a reasonable 
civilian. Unlike the NATO committee, the Galic Chamber at the 
ICTY and the Canadian military manual do not express the standard 
in terms of a reasonable military commander, but that of a reasonable 
person of an undefined character in the circumstances of the actual 
commander. In the case of the ICTY, this may be explained at least in 
part by the fact that the Balkan conflict involved so many civilians 
serving ad hoc in the military and quasi-military positions. Other 
scholars have suggested as well that it is preferable for civil society to 
set the underlying values of proportionality, forcing the military to 
conform to those values, and not vice-versa. 188 
The circumstances of an attack include the arsenal available to the 
attacker and their capabilities. Drones are the most accurate189 means 
of deploying bombs the United States has ever possessed. In World 
War II, conventional bombs dropped from aircraft were accurate to 
within 3,300 feet of their target. In the Korean War, the accuracy was 
improved to 1,000 feet. In Vietnam, the accuracy was improved to 
400 feet, in Operation Desert Storm to 200 feet, and in the Balkan 
Wars to 40 feet.190 Drones render all of these statistics obsolete. 
Drones have pinpoint accuracy thanks to laser and global satellite 
positioning systems.191 They have the ability to loiter or track a target 
(“persistence”), which allows the attacker to delay an attack to 
minimize collateral harm.192 Bombs are deployed by two kinds of 
 
187 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Can., B-GJ-005-
104/FP-021, § 5 ¶ 27, (Aug. 13, 2001). See also Law of Armed Conflict, Commander’s 
Guide, 37 AUSTL. DEF. FORCE PUBLICATION SUPP. 1, 9–10 (Mar. 7, 1994); New Zealand, 
Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, N.Z. DEF. FORCE, ¶ 515(4), (Nov. 
1992); Yugoslav Regulation on the Application of international Laws of War in the Armed 
Forces of the SRFY, ¶ 72 (1988). 
188 Bothe, supra note 183, at 535. 
189 Technical accuracy of a weapon is its capability of striking an intended target. This 
of course says nothing about the accuracy of the intelligence, analysis or methodology of 
target selection. 
190 Wall, supra note 157, at 286. 
191 See Flight of the Drones: Why the Future of Air Power Belongs to Unmanned 
Systems, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21531433; see 
Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BBC (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10713898. 
192 Id. 
214 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16, 173 
drones, the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper.193 The Predator and 
Reaper deploy Hellfire missiles, which are small, 100-pound missiles 
that can be fitted with a comparatively small warhead (2.2 pounds of 
explosive) that limits collateral harm.194 They are generally 
considered capable of destroying small targets such as vehicles 
without destroying surrounding objects. When the proportionality of 
at attack is scrutinized in the future, the increasing precision and 
discriminatory capabilities of drones will be imputed to the attacker. 
This will place great pressure on the attacker to avoid civilian harm195 
because the attacker will have the technical ability to do so. 
While “excessiveness” is judged by the reasonable person standard, 
the perpetrator must be shown to have actual knowledge of the 
circumstances that give rise to the conclusion the attack was 
disproportionate. The Galic Chambers relied on Article 85(3)(b) of 
AP I in finding that to establish the mens rea for a violation of 
proportionality: “the Prosecution must prove . . . that the attack was 
launched willfully and in knowledge of circumstances giving rise to 
the expectation of excessive civilian casualties.”196 
In practice, evidence of the attacker’s actual knowledge at the time 
of the attack can be difficult to secure, leaving prosecutors with 
circumstantial arguments. In Galic, for example, the duration of the 
sniping and shelling campaign lasted four years and that effectively 
precluded Galic from arguing a lack of knowledge. In those 
circumstances, the Chamber was willing to infer knowledge.197 In 
other cases, where it is established that the attacker was in receipt of 
some information that triggered a duty to inquire further and he failed 
to do so, Chambers have imputed knowledge based on a duty to 
inquire further accompanied by a failure to do so.198 
Thus, because of the protracted nature of the conflicts in the 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan theatre, and specifically hundreds of 
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drone attacks with reports of civilian casualties,199 it would be 
difficult for a UAV commander to successfully argue he or she lacked 
knowledge of the potential for civilian harm. 
Proportionality in the Rome Statute also requires that the 
perpetrator knew of the circumstances that gave rise to the 
expectation that the attack would be clearly excessive.200 The ICC 
Element of Crimes goes on to explain 
[T]his knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make the 
value judgement as described therein. An evaluation of that value 
judgment must be based on the requisite information available to 
the perpetrator at the time.201 
The Rome Statute codifies a higher standard than the ICTY, even 
though the Galic Chamber held that the attack was “clearly 
excessive” and may have, in effect, applied that same standard. The 
NATO bombing committee set up the ICTY prosecutor indicated in 
its report that the use of the word “clearly” ensures that criminal 
responsibility would be entailed only in cases where the excessiveness 
of the incidental damage was obvious.202 The use of the word 
“clearly” ensures that proportionality amounts to a war crime where 
the excessiveness of incidental damage was obvious but not in cases 
that involved mere errors of judgment by commanders in the field.203 
While the Rome Statute explicitly states that it does purport to 
change customary law, there some commentators have asserted that 
the “clearly excessive” standard under the Rome Statute may reflect 
custom.204 Therefore it would be prudent when analyzing 
proportionality to UAV warfare to assume that the Rome Statute 
version (clearly excessive) will be the standard applied. 
G. Harm to Objects Will Be Given More Latitude 
Sixth, “acceptable” civilian harm will be viewed more leniently 
when it does not entail physical harm to people. The parameters of the 
discussion during the AP 1 negotiations shed light on the mindset of 
States in the 1970s about the era’s view of allowable civilian harm. 
Countries advancing the concept of proportionality made reference to 
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almost negligible allowable casualties. Canada declared that the 
incidental loss of a single civilian would not be considered excessive 
when weighed against a “major” military objective.205 The United 
Kingdom expressed a similar sentiment, stating that it was “difficult 
to visualize an attacker who would not carry out an assault upon an 
entrenched adversary because of the presence of one or two 
civilians.”206 
Both views are expressed in the context of one or two civilian 
deaths—even in the case of Canada measured against major military 
objectives. Contextually, the statements infer that the view on 
acceptable civilian harm was extremely modest, measured in single 
civilian casualties, not tens or hundreds. 
This proposition is further supported by the contrast with language 
used to explain proportionality with regard to civilian property. The 
commentaries explain that “if the destruction of a bridge is of 
paramount importance for the occupation or non-occupation of a 
strategic zone, it is understood that some houses may be hit, but not 
that a whole urban area be leveled.”207 
Here, the quantitative language is more relaxed. In this instance, 
“some houses” is clearly proportional within the lower threshold and 
the upper threshold is only limited to something less than “an entire 
urban area.” Implicit in these contrasting terms is a two-tiered 
approach to determining “excess”: a higher scrutiny where the 
expected harm includes loss of human lives, a lower scrutiny where 
the harm is limited to objects or structures. 
H. Low-Ranking Soldiers Will Generally Not Confer a Lot of 
Military Advantage 
Seventh, one can glean from the ICTY jurisprudence that low-
ranking soldiers will not constitute much of a military advantage 
absent some exigent circumstances. 
An attack targeting a low-ranking soldier which is used to justify 
civilian harm will be viewed skeptically. This was evident in the 
Galic case, where the Trial Chamber ruled on the proportionality of 
the mortar attack on a soccer match that included both low-ranking 
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soldiers and civilians.208 The Chamber assigned little value to the 
attack directed at low-ranking soldiers that would incur certain 
civilian harm, even where there were soldiers were present in 
“significant numbers.” It argued that 
[H]ad the [attacking] . . . troops been informed of this gathering and 
of the presence of [enemy] . . . soldiers there, and had intended to 
target these soldiers, this attack would nevertheless be unlawful. 
Although the number of soldiers present at the game was 
significant, an attack on a crowd of approximately 200 people, 
including numerous children, would clearly be expected to cause 
incidental loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive in relation 
to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.209 
What is important about this finding is that soldiers had no 
particular strategic or tactical value by virtue of their combat 
assignment. They were not defending territory or a military asset, nor 
were they engaged in the moment of the attack in a particular military 
operation. The sole military value of the soldiers at the time of the 
attack was the fact they were enemy combatants. The Trial Chamber 
did not explicitly quantify the expected military advantage of the 
attack, but it is clear the Chamber did not consider the elimination of 
individual combatants as conferring a significant military advantage. 
A United Nations fact-finding mission came to a similar 
conclusion. The United Nations established a mission to investigate 
the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip in 2009.210 In one incident, the 
Mission found that Israel had deliberately attacked policemen, a 
percentage of whom were also Hamas militants. None of the militants 
were identified in the report as having any particular military value 
because of rank or function. Nor were any militants in active combat 
functions such as preparing a rocket for launch. Like Galic, some of 
policemen were combatants and hence legitimate military targets. But 
in the face of certain civilian harm, killing low-ranking militants did 
not confer a significant direct and concrete military advantage—at 
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least any that justified the civilians put at risk with the attack. The 
report concluded that there was a prima facie case that the attacks 
were disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international 
law.211 The clear inference here is that an attack against low-ranking 
combatants who are not engaged in imminently dangerous activities 
will be assigned a marginal military advantage. 
There is every reason to think that this logic would carry over to 
drones in the UAV Warfare context. Unless an insurgent is engaged 
in a threatening activity such as placing an explosive device, his 
elimination would not justify harm to civilians particularly when the 
persistent stare ability of the UAV would allow them to tracking the 
target until the risk to civilian harm is virtually eliminated or at least 
minimized. This seems to be the case in the conventional armed 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where there is evidence to support 
the view that the U.S. Military also assigns a low military advantage 
to the elimination individual insurgents in armed conflict areas like 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
One thing for certain is that the United States clearly understands 
that UAV Warfare gives them an unprecedented ability to be cautious 
in avoiding civilian harm if they so choose. An operations officer for 
an unmanned aircraft systems training battalion who had served 
several tours of duty in Iraq stated to the author at the Association for 
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International “Unmanned Systems North 
America” conference in August 2010 that his understanding as a 
commander was that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) forbade him 
from inflicting any civilian casualties.212 The United States Rules of 
Engagement applicable to Iraq, publicly leaked to Wikileaks.com, 
forbids any use of force except when a target is positively identified 
as a combatant. The ROE begins with the statement the 
proportionality is the operative principle when using force: “At all 
times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality will form the 
basis of the judgment of the on-scene commander (OSC) or individual 
as to what constitutes an appropriate response in self-defense to a 
particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”213 
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There is no explanation about what proportionality means. 
However, the subsequent two paragraphs that set forth a very 
restrictive policy of the application of force. Paragraph 3.A.(4) 
requires that “[a]ll personnel must ensure that, prior to any 
engagement, non-combatants and civilian structures are distinguished 
from proper military targets.”214 
This provision goes beyond that langauge of AP I, Article 
57(2)(a)(i) that generally requirement an attacker to make all feasible 
efforts to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Paragraph 
3.A.(4) forbids all use of force until a positive identification is made. 
The effect of this rule is to severely minimize, if not avoid, collateral 
civilian harm. The next paragraph, Paragraph 3.A.(5), is similarly 
restrictive. It requires that “[p]ositive Identification (PID) of all 
targets is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty 
that the individual or object of attack is a legitimate military target in 
accordance with these ROE.”215 
While neither paragraph directly addresses proportionality, both 
clearly establish a framework in which in the armed conflict in Iraq 
the United State assigns is tolerating a low level of collateral harm. 
This is supported by a publicly aired television news segment on 
UAV operations at Creech Air Force Base. The segment provided 
several instances the Air Force exploited the loitering capability of 
drones to take extraordinary caution in the instance of a single, low 
value suspected enemy combatant.216 In one case, the belligerent was 
a suspected sniper, and the UAV unit requested the ground forces to 
“start your engines and just move ten meters for me” to provoke the 
suspect into action, thus confirming the identification.217 The tactic 
worked, and the infrared cameras of the UAV could detect the sniper 
pulling his rifle out and were able to engage that individual. 
The allure of precision, however, can create an unrealistic 
expectation of its possibilities that would serve to impose 
unreasonable demands on the military or postulate norms to 
completely eliminate collateral damage.218 But while the precision of 
weaponry continues to increase, the prevalence of asymmetrical 
conflicts against irregular combatants hiding within civilian 
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populations decreases the margin of error between combatant and 
civilian targets. Thus, the attack against Baitullah Mehsud on the 
rooftop of a home occupied by twelve other persons in an urban area 
may have represented the best alternative in terms of humanitarian 
risk. The UAV could precisely target the home, and it could deploy a 
bomb that minimized the risk to surrounding structures. In theory, the 
United States could have deployed ground forces to engage Mehsud 
directly in order to spare the other civilians in the building. However, 
he was an evanescent target and in terms of military advantage, the 
United States would be entitled to factor in the risk that ground forces 
would alert Mehsud of their presence and increase the risk of his 
escape. In terms of collateral damage, there is no certainty that 
engagement by ground forces would have been able to decrease the 
risk to civilians, but it certainly would have increased the risk of own-
side losses. 
I. Cumulative Effect Doctrine Will Come into Play with UAV 
Warfare 
Eighth, when strategic proportionality is at issue, the “cumulative 
effect” doctrine may come into play. The cumulative effect doctrine 
was first articulated in the ICTY Kupreskic Trial Judgment, where 
that Chamber concluded that an extended campaign consisting of a 
series of attacks, each of which might be a close call in regards to 
proportionality, in the end would lead to the conclusion that the 
campaign was disproportionate because of the “cumulative effect” on 
civilians. The Trial Chamber found that 
[I]t may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing 
incidental damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to 
their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul 
per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or of the 
corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated 
attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between 
indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to 
conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they 
may not be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of 
military conduct may turn out to jeopardize excessively the lives 
and assets of civilians, contrary to the demands of humanity.219 
This was interpreted by the ICTY NATO Committee as follows: 
This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive 
statement of the applicable law with regard to the obligation to 
protect civilians. Its practical import, however, is somewhat 
 
219 Kupreskic, supra note 172, at ¶ 526. 
2014] Applying Jus In Bello Proportionality 221 
to Drone Warfare 
ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is the committee’s 
view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military 
objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all 
of which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said 
to amount to a crime. The committee understands the above 
formulation, instead, to refer to an overall assessment of the totality 
of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign.220 
J. The Enemies’ Criminality Will Be Taken into Account 
Ninth, a tribunal would take into account the enemy’s criminality 
in an “excessive” analysis. 
An emblematic aspect of modern warfare is the asymmetry of the 
combatant forces. In Operation Cast Lead, Israel faced Hamas 
belligerents who hid amidst the civilian population in Gaza. In Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, among others, the United States is 
fighting against irregular forces who dress as civilians and 
intermingling with them in urban areas. This tactic is designed in part 
to use the civilians as a human shield, assuming that unrestrained 
combat against a mixed combatant and civilian population is 
untenable. It also allows the irregular force to claim a public relations 
victory by publicizing civilian fatalities incurred when a particular 
belligerent is killed by a drone. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and other irregular 
combatant forces violate humanitarian law on an ongoing basis when 
they use civilians as human shields in an attempt to protect, conceal, 
or render military objects immune from military operations or force 
them to leave their homes or shelters to disrupt the movement of an 
adversary. 
However, the criminality of an irregular force such as the Taliban 
does not relieve the attacker of its obligation to comply with the 
principle of proportionality. The Galic Chamber so held, finding 
“[T]he failure of a party to abide by this obligation does not relieve 
the attacking side of its duty to abide by the principles of distinction 
and proportionality when launching an attack.”221 
The official position of the United States military is in accord, 
providing that “[i]n such cases, otherwise lawful targets shielded with 
protected civilians may be attacked, and the protected civilians may 
be considered as collateral damage, provided that the collateral 
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damage is not excessive compared to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated by the attack.”222 
Academics argue that any tribunal considering an attack in such 
circumstances would enforce the principle of proportionality but 
would “be obliged to weigh in the balance in favor of the attackers 
any such illegal activity by the defenders.”223 Or in other words, that 
the tribunal would likely impose a higher “excessive” liability 
threshold in a criminal prosecution for a violation of proportionality. 
A related issue in asymetrical conflicts is whether or not there is 
any requirement under international law to put your own-side forces 
at risk if doing so would vitiate the anticipated harm. The United 
States currently justifies using drones for the reason that it is an 
effective tactic against irregular combatants hinding in civilian areas 
coupled with the fact that it doesn’t put any United States personnel at 
risk. A commander is entitled to factor the risk to his own troops, 
equipment, and supplies when assessing the military advantage of an 
attack.224 As previously stated, a commander is allowed to take into 
consideration that own-side losses a factor decreasing the anticipated 
military advantage. And there is no express requirement in AP I for 
commanders “to place themselves or their subordinates at risk in 
order to avoid harm to civilians and civilian property.”225 
Commanders are obligated to consider the impact of a tactic on the 
civilian population.226 Experts have asserted that “[i]t is reasonable to 
require military forces to assume some degree of risk to avoid 
collateral damage and incidental injury” and that “the greater the 
anticipated collateral damage or incidental injury, the greater the risk 
they can reasonably be asked to shoulder.”227 By this analysis, the 
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United States would not be permitted to adopt a strategy with drones 
that elevates the protection of its own forces over humanitarian 
concerns. In the Mehsud attack, therefore, it would have been 
incumbent upon the commander to consider the available alternatives 
to the UAV attack and assume some risk of own-side harm. 
While UAV warfare in theory could eliminate the risk of own-side 
losses in certain circumstances, in current U.S. practice in Iraq and 
Afghanistan it does not. In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military 
requires confirmation by ground forces in order to confirm 
indentification. An ABC news report on drones was given security 
clearance to interview a unit of UAV operators piloting drones in 
Afghanistan in 2010.228 The news team documented one instance 
where five insurgents were seen to be planting an improvised 
explosive device (IED) on a UAV video feed in an area known for the 
use of IEDs. Before the UAV could deploy lethal force, the UAV 
pilots explained to the reporters that the ROE required positive 
confirmation of the targets by a ground force. The practice was to not 
take any chances that the five persons may be civilians. The 
capabilities of the drones allowed for the drones to furtively track the 
suspects while a ground force moved and established direct contact.229 
Ground force confirmation, unlike a UAVattack alone, injects risk 
into the equation because live soldier are deployed in conflict zone. In 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, however, the United States does not 
the same ability to deploy soldiers on the ground to gather 
intelligence, and yet we use lethal force in these places nonetheles0s. 
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the calculation of expected civilian harm 
would include the ground confirmation policy. And in places where 
ground confirmation is not an option, the commander must factor that 
in calculation of expected harm. 
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CONCLUSION 
One scarcely encounters an article about a drone attack in the 
newspaper without a quote from an expert or academic who 
comments on the attack’s lack of proportionality. Rarely if ever do 
these articles examine these conclusions or take the time to consider 
IHL Proportionality in careful detail. In this Article I have attempted 
to do just that. IHL Proportionality is elegantly simple at first glance. 
But teasing apart its components sheds light on its profound 
complexities. Coupled with the fact that UAV warfare has profoundly 
changed the conduct of warfare, it is easy to see why writers avoid the 
details in proportionality. 
There are two things about which humanitarian law scholars 
always agree. The first is that it is extremely difficult to apply IHL 
Proportionality to any particular set of circumstances. The second is 
that the law of war lags far behind the technologies of war. 
This Article sits at the confluence of those two truths, applying a 
vexing rule to a technological revolution that remains beyond the 
grasp of most. 
The silver lining is that modern weapons of war give us the ability 
to be patient and precise in ways previously unimaginable. My hope 
is that the laws of war can catch up quickly to technology and impose 
a commensurate legal obligation. 
 
